How Russia is Preventing Formation of UN "Standing" Forces | Knowledge is Power
The Russian Federation is not only vetoing action required by the UN Charter. It is preventing the formation of bodies to even carry out Security Council resolutions.
The Russian Federation is not only vetoing action required by the UN Charter. It is preventing the formation of bodies to even carry out Security Council resolutions.
My previous articles have covered the fraud by Russia on the UN, the easy removal of it in a week, and how that would restore the United Nations without any reform required.
I have also dealt with the Kremlin propaganda and arms industry astro turf that the UN is “toothless”, pointing out it’s powers.
Here, I refute a specific part of the “toothless” argument: that the UN is “not like the Police”.
How Russia’s Obstruction Has Prevented the UN From Acting: Explaining Articles 43, 45, and 47
The United Nations Charter provides a structure where the Security Council can deploy standing military forces quickly and under centralized command to stop aggression. The relevant rules are Articles 43, 45, and 47, which most people have never heard of — yet they are central to understanding how Russia has disabled the UN.
What the Articles Say and How They Work
Article 43:
Requires member states to make their armed forces available to the UN.
These forces would act under UN command to carry out Security Council resolutions.
Requires contracts for standing forces to be made by the Security Council.
Article 45:
Requires member states to maintain air force contingents immediately available for rapid deployment.
Article 47:
Creates the Military Staff Committee (MSC), composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council (P5).
This Committee is supposed to plan and direct the use of UN forces provided under Articles 43 and 45, as directed by the Security Council.
Together, these articles were meant to allow the UN to respond quickly to threats without relying on coalitions that are assembled ad hoc.
What Actually Happened
Historically, the USSR blocked the implementation of these articles:
Insisted on veto power over any operational command.
Limited what forces could be contributed and where they could operate.
Refused to place forces under UN operational control.
As a result, Article 43 agreements were never concluded, Article 45 forces were never maintained as “immediately available,” and the MSC became largely symbolic.
After the Cold War, Russia continued the same obstruction, supporting only voluntary, nationally commanded deployments. The UN today still lacks a standing force under its own command and relies entirely on temporary coalitions.
Consequences of Russia’s Obstruction
No central UN command – all enforcement actions are ad hoc, making them slower and inconsistent.
Deviation from the Charter – the UN cannot operate as originally intended under Articles 43–47.
P5 veto deadlock – Russia’s presence prevents the Security Council from authorizing standing forces in a way that would work legally and operationally.
How the UN Could Finally Implement Articles 43 and 45 Without Russia
Without Russia’s illegal participation, the remaining P4 (US, UK, France, China) could implement the system as intended:
Security Council Resolution – narrowly defines objectives, geographic limits, and restrictions like no nuclear use.
Military Staff Committee Oversight – directs forces according to the SC mandate, preventing mission creep.
National Command Respect – states maintain command but comply with MSC instructions within limits.
Standing Force Agreements – legally binding commitments of troops, air units, and logistics.
Immediate Availability – forces pre-deployed and ready to respond rapidly.
This approach addresses all historical concerns of the remaining P4 and finally gives the UN a legal, functioning standing force.
Why This Matters
Russia’s continued obstruction has left the UN incapable of fulfilling its Charter mandate. Removing Russia’s illegal participation would allow:
Creation of a standing UN force.
Effective enforcement of Security Council resolutions.
Restoration of the UN’s legally prescribed collective security powers.
In short, the failure to implement Articles 43–47 is not a flaw in the Charter — it is a direct result of decades of obstruction by the USSR and Russia. Without them, the UN could finally act as the world body it was designed to be.
More detail: Russia’s Obstruction of UN Enforcement Structures and Implications for Membership
I. Background
The UN Charter envisaged standing military forces under Articles 43, 45, and 47, directed by the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and deployed pursuant to Security Council resolutions. These forces were intended to:
Allow rapid, coordinated responses to threats to international peace and security.
Ensure that operational command was exercised collectively under UN authority, preventing unilateral action or mission creep.
Provide P5 oversight while avoiding political deadlock caused by national vetoes at every stage of deployment.
However, the USSR systematically blocked the creation of Article 43 agreements and the functioning of the MSC. Its objections centered on:
Maintaining P5 veto control over all operational decisions, even post-Security Council resolution.
Limiting the number and type of forces contributed, and preventing deployment near Soviet territory.
Ensuring forces would remain under national command rather than UN operational control.
The result: Article 43 agreements were never concluded, Article 45 “immediate availability” provisions were unrealized, and the MSC became functionally inert.
Post-Cold War, the Russian Federation perpetuated the same obstruction, supporting only ad hoc, nationally commanded contributions, and rejecting any binding UN military structure. The UN’s operational practice has therefore shifted to voluntary coalitions of the willing, lacking Charter-based standing forces.
II. Legal Consequences of Russia’s Obstruction
Failure to implement Charter-mandated mechanisms
The UN remains incapable of deploying forces under centralized UN command.
All Security Council enforcement actions depend on ad hoc coalitions, vulnerable to mission creep and inconsistent rules of engagement.
Violation of the Charter’s original design
The Charter prescribes rapid, collective action under MSC oversight.
Russia’s obstruction has permanently substituted ad hoc arrangements for the legally mandated system, undermining the UN’s collective security function.
P5 Veto Deadlock
Historically, the USSR/Russia used veto or threat of veto to prevent operationalization of Article 43, even when limited operational instructions could have satisfied concerns.
The Security Council remains structurally incapable of executing Charter-designed deployments while the UN pretends that Russia is a member.
III. Roadmap for Post-Russia Implementation
Without Russia’s illegal participation, the remaining P4 (US, UK, France, China) could implement the original Article 43/45 design with specific safeguards:
Security Council Resolution
Defines narrow operational objectives (e.g., “repel invaders, no nuclear use, report back for further measures”).
Military Staff Committee Oversight
MSC composed of P4 Chiefs of Staff directs forces under SC mandate, preventing mission creep.
National Command and Sovereignty
Contributing states retain command but follow MSC instructions within defined limits.
Standing Force Agreements
Troops, air units, and logistical support committed under legally binding standby agreements.
Immediate Availability
Forces are pre-deployed for rapid response, fulfilling Article 45 requirements.
✅ This framework addresses the historical concerns of P4 members, ensures compliance with the Charter, and finally operationalizes UN standing forces — demonstrating the obstructionist effect of Russia’s continued imposture in the UN.
IV. Conclusion: Membership Implications
Russia’s persistent obstruction of Article 43/45/47 has prevented lawful, Charter-compliant enforcement mechanisms.
Its presence on the Security Council continues to block the implementation of a central UN military capability, leaving the world reliant on ad hoc coalitions outside Charter control.
Expulsion of Russia would remove the primary barrier, enabling:
Establishment of a standing UN force.
Effective enforcement of Council resolutions under Chapter VII.
Restoration of the UN’s legally prescribed collective security functions.
Legal inference: Russia’s obstruction is not merely historical; it perpetuates structural incapacity within the UN.
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